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1. Introduction 
Empirical investigations of the relationship bet\V~en eccmo111ic; variables 
an(:I :voting behavior fall into two broad categories, On the one Jiand, 
there are studies which link actual voting outcomes or highly aggregated 
popularity series to time series of key macroeconomic indicators like 
rates of unemployment, inflation, income, or economic growth. This re-
search generally follows longitudinal designs, and rarelv are economic indi-
cators and political outcomes brok.en down for regional units below the 
level of the nation state. On the other hand, one encounters analyses of 
cross-sectional survey data which focus on the impact of economic per-
ceptions and expectations on indivdual voting behavior within specific 
elections. 
In the Federal Republic, both research traditions have found adher-
ents in recent years. Economists, on the whole, have tended to favor the 
first perspective. Following Frey's work several of his collaborators like 
Schneider (1974) and Kirchgässner (1977) have integrated their empiri-
cal investigations of the impact of macroeconomic performance on elec-
tion outcomes or on government popularity into models of politico-
economic interactions. Economic conditions are seen as key arguments 
of the utility functions of rational voters who cast their votes in order to 
maximize expected benefits. Politicians, on the other hand, who perceive 
the electoral impact of economic policy, use the government's economic 
instruments in order to secure re-election. Without doing too much injus-
tice to individual contributions, most of these longitudinal analyses using 
macro data reach very similar conclusions, i.e. that economic conditions 
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actually do have identifiable effects on government popularity or on the 
distribution of intentions to vote. Numerous studies have found similar 
effects in the United States (and other countries): economic downturns 
detract from the electoral support of the current government. This, of 
course, is highly compatible with the Downsian model of rational voting 
behavior. 
Most political scientists in the Federal Republic, on the other hand, have 
preferred to work with micro data from mass surveys when analyzing the 
political effects of economic developments. And, what is more important, 
their conclusions have been far less positive. Kaltefleiter O 978) and 
especially Roth (1973) argµethat respondents' evaluations of the overall 
economic situation largely reflect the propaganda of their preferred party 
while their evaluation of t}1eir individual economic Situation mirrors their 
current prosperity. Thus, the direction of causality is the reverse of that 
in the macro studies: voters do not prefer one political party over another 
because of their economic perceptions, but they hold certain views on 
the state of the economy because they prefer a particular party. In his 
most recent article on the 197 6 election Roth (1977) focuses on unem-
ployment alone. He again concludes that atlitüdes on unemployment -
who is blamed for it and who voters believe will be able to reduce it - are 
consequences, not causes, of party preference. Since rather few respon-
dents are actually unemployed themselves, Roth declines to comment on 
the political behavior of that particular group. 
Available research on the relationship between economic conditions 
and mass political behavior in the FRG is therefore characterized by an 
obvious inconsistency between findings at the macro and the micro level 
of analysis. Whereas longitudinal aggregate data studies have revealed 
patterns familiar in other countries, so far survey-based research has failed 
to corroborate these results. The purpose of this paper is not to over-
come or to account for this contradiction but rather to take another 
look at the most recent federal election in the Federal Republic, that of 
1976, using both kinds of data in a cross-sectional investigation of the 
political impact of unemployment. 1 shall concentrate on unemployment 
because it has emerged as the most important macroeconomic variable in 
the last few years. 
This approach offers a more straightforward opportunity to compare 
results derived from these different kinds of data than is currently at hand. 
What is a powerful predictor of government popularity over time need 
not be so across in<lividuals or regional aggregates. As there is no logical 
necessity that both approaches should yield congruent results, several 
arguments between analysts relying on longitudinal macro data and sur-
vey researchers are somewhat beside the point. Before presenting results 
first from aggregate and then from individual level data, l will first briefly 
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discuss some hypotheses which describe what kind of relationships be-
tween unemployment and voting behavior one might expect to find in 
both data sets. 
2. Some hypotheses 
According to Downs (19 5 7) it is useful to assum e that voters cast their 
mfos in order to maximize expected utility. Kramer (1971) has derived 
ffie implications of this axiom for the relationship between economic 
conditions and voting behavior. As long as economic performance is 
"good enough", supporters of the government will, ceteris paribus, re-
main loyal. But as a country experiences an economic downturn, defec-
tions from the governing party will increase in proportion to the severity 
of recession because many voters will place responsibility for handling 
the economy with the current political office-holders. 1 call this an "anti-
government hypothesis" since it predicts that incumbents will be blamed 
for all kinds of economic hardships - high and/ or rising inflation or 
unemployment and low and/or declining income or growth rates - and 
as a result their electoral support will decline. For the 1976 elections in 
West Germany this implies that high and/or rising unemployment should 
have hurt the parties of the government coalition - the Social Democrats 
and Free Democrats. Whether there has been a corresponding positive 
effect of economic recovery will not concern us here. 
Most empirical studies of politico-economic interactions have pro-
ceeded from the antigovernment hypothesis, and many have found evi-
dence to support these ideas. lt seems to me, however, that it is by no 
means the only plausible interpretation of voter rationality. Common 
sense suggcsts that different political parties pay attention to the eco-
nomic interests of different segments of the electorate. In a cross-national 
analysis of macroeconomic policies in several major industrial societies, 
Hibbs (1977) has shown that the redistributive policies of bourgeois 
governments have systematically differed from those of governments led 
by socialist or workers' parties. In the case of unemployment this would 
imply that socialist governments on the whole should be more deter-
mined to fight unemployment while allowing for comparatively higher 
rates of inflation since their traditional supporters in the electorate are 
likely to be more hurt by unemployment than by inflation. For bour-
geois governments these priorities should be reversed. If these patterns 
are perceived within the electorate - and there is evidence that they are 
- it is illogical to predict electoral defeat for a socialist government if 
unemployment rises. On the contrary, this should have a rallying effect 
among the governing party's traditional clientele and should pull unde-
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cided voters who are worried about unemployment into its camp. For 
the same reasons a bourgeois government should be helped by high and/ or 
rising inflation. These considerations, moreover, are independent of 
whether a party is a member of the governing coalition or not. If unem-
ployment is a pressing problem and if socialists or social democrats are 
expected to do more about it than their competitors, they should benefit 
at the polls whether or not they have been in power. 1 call this the 
"clientele hypothesis" since it rests on the assumption that in formulating 
their macroeconomic policies political parties tend to take the economic 
interests of their traditional clientele into account and that over time this 
pattern shapes perceptions of who is likely to attack a given economic 
prob lern. 
In the context of the 1976 election the clientele hypothesis predicts 
that the Social Democrats would benefit from unemployment at the 
expense of the bourgeois parties, the Christian Democrats and the Free 
Democrats. This hypothesis is beset by one great uncertainty, however. If 
it is true that high unemployment mobilizes support for the Social Demo-
crats among their traditional supporters, it is equally conceivable that 
there is a similar rallying effect among bourgeois voters who are afraid of 
the inflationary side-effects of measures that a socialist government 
might take to fight unemployment. Thus, the overall effect of unem-
ployment on the aggregate election outcome rnight be negligible, per-
haps even the reverse of that hypothesized. The relative importance of 
these effects is, of course, an open empirical question. 1 will now turn to 
examining the merits of both the antigovernment and clientele hypotheses 
for describing the consequences of unemployment on the 1976 election, 
drawing first on aggregate and Iater on survey data. 
3. The 1976 election at the district level 
Most longitudinal studies of the relationship between macroeconomic 
variables and voting outcomes have concluded that previous election re-
sults should be included among the set of independent variables. The 
arguments supporting this specification also hold for cross-sectional analy-
ses, but in our particular case there is a severe practical obstacle to pro-
ceeding accordingly. For all 223 federal election districts which are being 
analyzed here vote shares of the two maj or parties in the 197 6 election 
correlate higher than 0.99 with those in1972 so that there is virtl,lally no 
variance-ietTto}_~~~fo_ei!-_by ilnemi)10-yment-if tiie-faiie<l e~<logenous 
variables are in a first step entered into regression models. 
--- Theiefore,the ovei-an regional ctistribution of votes cast in 1976 for 
the three major parties is accounted for by relating their district vote 
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shares to district percentages of Catholics, of blue-collar workers, of 
agricultural employees, and of high-school degree graduates (Abitur) 
which are available from census data. 1 In a first step each of these four 
variables was allowed to take different slopes in each ofthe ten states. In a 
second step, states for which similar slopes for a given independent"vari-
able had been found were grouped together on this particular variable so 
that in the end there were three groups of states for the education and 
agriculture variables and two groups of states for the religion and dass 
variables, making a total of ten structural predictor variables. Correcting 
for degrees of freedom, these models account for 85.4 percent in the 
variance of the 1976 district vote shares for the CDU/CSU, 81.0 percent 
for the SPD, and 72.6 percent for the FDP. 
Proceeding from these models as null models, unemployment will now 
be entered as an additional predictor variable. Unemployment figures for 
a given district at a given time are due to the overall business cycle but also 
to the structure of the regional labor market. The business cycle compo-
nen t will be measured by the change in the district rate ofunemployment 
between September 1976 (the election was held in October) and Septem-
ber 197 5. The structural component will be measured by the district rate 
of unemployment of September 1972 which has a mean value of 0.9 
percent, a minimum of 0.2 and a maximum of 2.3 percent. These figures 
indicate a tight labor market where unemployment in many districts may 
be ignorcd. At the same time there are a number of districts for which 
unemployment is more than double the nation-wide average. If one ex-
amines these districts more closely, it is obvious that comparatively high 
1972 district rates of unemployment correspond to certain exceptional 
problems of regional economic structure. The correlation between both 
indicators of structural unemployment and of business cycle unemploy-
ment is 0.39, indicating that unemployment due to the business cycle 
strikes particularly severely and recovery takes langer in disadvantaged 
areas. On the other hand, the collinearity between the two explanatory 
variables is not too great to prevent a simultaneous assessment of the 
separate effects of both dimensions of unemployment. 
Parameter estimates derived from entering both indicators of unem-
ployment separately and jointly into the null models are presented in 
1 Data from the 1970 census and election statistics have been made avai!able by 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. Unemployment statistics come from theßundes-
anstalt für Arbeit, Nuremberg. 
For Bundestag elections there are 248 electoral districts. Census data, however, 
are not available for districts but for towns and cities. As long as districts are !arger 
than cities, it is a simple matter to aggregate appropriate census data. For 14 cities in 
39 districts this is not the case and each city must be treated as one district. This 
brings the total number of units of analysis down to 223. 
Table 7.1 
Regression of party vote shares on null model variables and on unemployment. 
Rate of unemployment, 
September 197 2 
Change in the rate 
of unemployment, 
September 197 5-
September 1976 
-0.022 
(0.006) 
R. 2 0.863 
S.E. 0.038 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
CDU/CSU 
-0.030 
(0.006) 
0.872 
0.037 
-0.013 
(0.006) 
-0.026 
(0.006) 
0.874 
0.037 
0.034 
(0.006) 
0.835 
0.038 
SPD 
0.034 
(0.006) 
0.837 
0.038 
0.025 
(0.006) 
0.026 
(0.006) 
0.848 
0.036 
-0.011 
(0.002) 
0.773 
0.011 
FDP 
-0.03 
(0.002) 
0.729 
0.012 
-0.011 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.772 
0.011 
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table 7.1. Unemployment due to the business cycle is found to have no 
significant effect on the vote share of the liberal party, the FDP. For the 
CDU/CSU and the SPD, on the other hand, a significant impact can be 
established with the Social Democrats scoring above the null model's 
prediction at the expense of the Christian Democrats in case of rising 
unemployment and vice versa for decreasing rates of unemployment. The 
increase in adjusted R 2 is 1.8 percent forthe CDU/CSU and 2.7 percent 
for the SPD. 
Structural unemployment has significant effects on the vote shares of 
all three parties. Where unemployment had been high in 1972, in 1976 
the SPD generally scored above the prediction of its null model while 
CDU/CSU and FDP remained below the predictions of their respective 
null models. Ceteris paribus, a district unemployrnent rate of 1 percent 
above average in 1972 in the 1976 election translated into an advantage of 
3.4 percent for the Social Democrats, of which two-thirds came from the 
Christian Democrats and one-third from the Free Democrats. 
Together with the results on unemployment induced by the business 
cycle, we find that the Downsian antigovernment hypothesis does not 
adequately describe the relationship between unemployment and elec-
tion outcomes in the Germ an 197 6 election. Rises in unemployment 
over the last 12 months preceding the election hurt the opposition and 
helped the governing Social Democrats. The presence of problems with 
the regional cconomic structure hurt the two bourgeois parties, and again 
helped the SPD. This supports the clientele hypothesis that high and/or 
rising unemployment should, ceteris paribus, increase the electoral sup-
port of socialist parties at the expense of bourgeois parties. Since the 
analysis reported here proceeds from structural null-models controlling 
for class, religion, education, and agriculture, there is no reason to sus-
pect that these results are due to the common dependence of unemploy-
men t and election outcomes on social structure. 
As a final step in the analysis of the aggregate data I will now look 
briefly at the regional stability of these patterns. A simple way to check 
the stability of these results is to estimate the coefficients of the two 
unernployment indicators for each state separately. For the change ofthe 
unernployment rate over the twelve months preceding the election this 
procedure reveals homogeneous relationships across all states, and uni-
form relationships are also found between the vote share of the FDP and 
structural unemployment. On the other hand, the effects of structural 
unemployment on vote shares of the two major parties do not seem to 
be stable across regions. How can we account for these differences? 
One plausible explanation can be derived from the observation that dis-
tricts with high structural unemployment tend tobe strongholds of one of 
the two major parties rather than marginal constituencies. Structural un-
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employment has not emerged in the mid-seventies, but has been a more 
or less permanent challenge in the areas concerned. If this challenge has 
not been an obstacle to the establishment of party strongholds, why 
should it adversely affect the electoral success in 1976 of the party 
which has enjoyed a solid majority in the past? 
One can go even further than that. CDU/CSU strongholds with com-
paratively high unemployment in 1972 tend to be agricultural constitu-
encies, notably in Bavaria. Structural unemployment there predomi-
nantly results from reduced demand for labor within agriculture and thus 
affects traditional clients of the CDU/CSU. Most SPD strongholds with 
comparatively high structural unemployment, on the other hand, are 
highly industrialized districts where structural unemployment results from 
industrial modernization and from the shrinking of industries Jike mining. 
Many of the people affected there are traditional SPD leaners. This sug-
gests that the regional instability of the relationship between CDU/CSU 
and SPD vote shares and structural unemployment might be due to the 
combination of two factors: that the effects of structural unemployment 
are different in strongholds of the two major parties and that these strong-
holds are unevenly distributed. 
If these considerations are correct there should be an interaction effect 
between the vote shares of the two major parties and structural unem-
ployment. In agricultural districts, where the SPD tends to be weak, 
structural unemployment is an agricultural problem, the SPD does not 
gain support when unemployment rises. In industrial regions, where the 
Table7.2 
Regression of party vote shares on null model variables and on unemployment speci-
fying interaction. 
CDU/SCU SPD 
Rate of unemployment, 0.165 -0.159 
September 1972 0.016) (0.016) 
lnteraction term -0.385 0.396 
(rate of unemployment (0.034) (0.033) 
1972 x SPD share 1976) 
Change in the rate of -0.010 0.010 
unemployment, September (0.005) (0.005) 
1975-September 1976 
R.2 0.922 0.911 
S.E. 0.029 0.028 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 7.3 
Coefficients of the rate of unemployrnent of September 1972 for different SPD vote 
shares. 
SPD in 1976 (%) 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
Coefficient of the rate of unemployrnent 
of September 1972 
CDU/CSU 
0.088 
0.069 
0.050 
0.030 
0.011 
-0.008 
-0.027 
-0.047 
-0.066 
-0.085 
SPD 
-0.079 
-0.060 
-0.040 
-0.020 
0.000 
0.020 
0.039 
0.059 
0.079 
0.099 
SPD tends to be strong, structural unemployment is an industrial prob-
lem and the SPD benefits from rising unemployment. This kind of inter-
actions is easily specified, and table 7. 2 summarizes the estimation re-
sults. Interaction obviously plays a major role, all coefficients are signifi-
cantly different from zero, and the introduction of the interaction term 
into the models of table 7 .2 raises the adjusted R 2 by 4.8 percent for the 
CDU/CSU and by 6.3 percent for the SPD. 
Table 7 .3 reveals that the coefficients of the district rate of unemploy-
ment of September 1972 are heavily dependent upon the distribution of 
votes among the two major parties. If both parties receive average shares 
there is virtually no effect of structural unemployment. In CDU/CSU 
strongholds with high structural unemployment the SPD remains far 
below the expectations derived from the null model, while in the SPD's 
own strongholds comparatively high rates of unemployment in Septem-
ber 1972 are associated with 1976 SPD vote shares far above the pre-
dictions of the null model. Thus, the clientele hypothesis, though cor-
rect in regard to tluctuations in unemployment associated with the 
business cycle, must be modified in order to describe the political impact 
of structural unemployment in the 1976 German election. Ifthis kind of 
unemployment occurs within a solid CDU/CSU milieu with strong agri-
cultural components where there are few traditional SPD clients, then 
the position of this traditionally dominant party is considerably en-
hanced. 
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4. Unemployment as an issue and personal experience with 
unemployment 
Further evidence on the effect of unemployment on the 1976 election 
may be found in survey data. The data base consists of the same three-
wave panel-survey that Roth (1977) has analyzed. 2 There were 2076 
respondents in the first wave in May 1976, 1529 respondents in the 
second wave in August/September, and 1196 respondents in the post-
election wave in October/November 1976. Among numerous other 
items, respondents were asked for their evaluatRfif of the situation in the 
laooi markef, wliom lliey thought mostcompetent to deal with unemploy-
ment, and whether they or their friends were currently without a job. 
Table 7.4 shows the relationship between vote intention and the salicnce 
of unemployment in the first wave of the panel. Respondents are catego-
rized into four groups: those who believe that securing jobs is very impor-
tant. those who believe that current unemployment is going to grow 
worse or at least is going to stay with us for quite some time, and those 
who have unemployed persons among their friends or who themsdves 
are unemployed. 
If we assume that the intention to vote is independent of evaluations 
of unemployment or from having experienced it, then the distribution of 
voting intentions in all four subsamples should correspond to the total 
sample. This is true only for respondents who think that securing jobs is 
very important. However, a sizable majority of respondents who believe 
that unemployment is a permanent rather than a temporary problem 
intend to vote for the CDU/CSU opposition. A majority of those who 
are unemployed themselves or who have unemployed friends, on the 
other hand, intend to vote for the Social Democrats while in the total 
sample the CDU/CSU enjoys an advantage of 2. 7 percent. The first devia-
tion is highly significant and seems to support the antigovernment hypo-
thesis; the latter deviation is compatible with the clientele hypothesis. 
These relationships turn out to be spurious, however, if we control for 
party identification. Almost 60 percent of the SPD identifiers believe 
that high unemployment is a transient phenomenon while about 70 per-
cent of the CDU/CSU identifiers think it will remain at these levels 
permanently or even worsen still further. Major party identifiers who 
have expectations on the future development of unemployment tend to 
reproduce the campaign propaganda of their preferred parties. As 57 
percent of those respondent::- who believe high unemployment to be a 
lasting problem are CDU/CSU identifiers it is no surprise that an almost 
2 Data were made available by the Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung, 
Co!ogne (Study no. 823). 
Intention 
to vote 
SPD 
CDU/CSU 
FDP 
Total 
Table 7.4 
Intentions to vote in the first panel-wave, May-June 1976. 
Total sample Securingjobs Unemployrnent Friends 
n (%) very important permanent unemployed 
742 43.7 604 43.5 332 34.3 140 49.l 
789 46.4 650 46.9 554 57.3 117 41.l 
168 9.9 133 9.6 81 8.4 28 9.8 
1699 1387 967 285 
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identical percentage intends to vote for the opposition. Similarly, as 
slightly more than 50 percent of the respondents who are unemployed 
themselves or have unemployed friends are SPD identifiers, voting inten-
tion among these respondents again merely reflects party identification. 
The overriding role of party identification is also weil illustrated in 
table 7.5. Here we find the percentages ofCDU-CSU and SPDidcntifiers 
actually intending to vote for their preferred party in the total sample and 
the four subsamples of table 7.4. If the antigovernment hypothesis were 
true, the likelihood of SPD identifiers voting for the SPD should decrease 
with growing personal relevance of unemployment, and simultaneously 
the likelihood of CDU identifiers to vote in accordance with their party 
identification should increase. If the clientele hypothesis were true we 
should find the opposite pattern. Instead, we see that the likelihood to 
vote consistently with one's partyldeTitifTcaITön is-the -same- across all 
28i~!Jps.UOifr-evfdence-ffierefore supports Roth's juagement that opinions 
on unemployment reflect party allegiance and do not influence electoral 
behavior and that political effects of having experienced unemployment 
cann_()t be detect~d i!l his surye,y ~ata:_" 
5. Perceived competence to fight unemployment and vote choice 
In a recently published study of the role of economic perceptions in the 
1976 election Jung (1978) analyzed a different three-wave panel survey, 
which was in the field in 1973, 1975, and 1976. One ofhis aimswas to 
identify that part of the electorate for whom a change in this perception 
of which party was most competent to cope with economic problems 
caused a subsequent change in their voting intention. For this purpose he 
classified respondents according to their party identification, perceived 
economic issue competence, and intention to vote at different points in 
time, and concluded that between 4 and 6 percent of the respondents 
could be shown to have adjusted their party identification and/or voting 
Table 7.5 
Intention to vote for preferred party (%) among CDU/CSU and SPD identifiers, first 
panel-wave. 
Party Total Secunng Unem- Friends Respon-
identification sample jobs very ployment unem· dent un-
important permanent ployed employed 
SPD 92.4 92.5 92.0 93.3 89.3 
CDU/CSU 95.7 95.5 95.6 93.8 94.4 
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intention to conform with a previous change in perceived competence of 
the parties in dealing with economic problems. 
Jung's procedure is replicated here with Roth's data. We have three 
variables - party identification, vote intention (recall in the third wave), 
and perceived competence to fight unemployment - measured at three 
poiilfs in time. Modifying Jung's classification somewhat, we arrive at 
the following seven categories. 
(1) Party identification remains constant, bu t issue com petence and 
vote intention change simultaneously or change in issue competence pre-
cedes parallel change in intention to vote. 
(2) Change in issue competence precedes changes in party identifica-
tion and vote intentions. 
(3) Vote intention remains constant, but issue competence and party 
identification change simultaneously or change in issue competence pre-
cedes parallel change in party identification. 
( 4) Party identification and intention to vote remain constant, bu t 
perceived issue competence changes without consequences for party iden-
tification or vote intention. 
(5) All three variables remain consonant and constant across all three 
panel-waves. 
(6) Patterns not conforming to categories (1) - (5) without missing 
observations. 
(7) At least one out of the nine observations missing. 
Those respondents whose vote-choice clearly depends upon their per-
ceptions of issue competence obviously fall into categories ( 1) and (2). 
This is not to say that perceived issue competence is meaningless for the 
voting behavior of other respondents, but for those in, for example, 
category (5) our analysis cannot teil whether constant party preference 
Table 7.6 
Classification of voters by perceived competence, vote intention, and party 
identification. 
Category Percent (number of respondents) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
0.1% 
0.5% 
0.3% 
1.6% 
50.2% 
28.6% 
18.8% 
(1) 
(6) 
(3) 
(19) 
(600) 
(342) 
(225) 
100.1% (1196) 
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is a function, or, more plausibly, a determinant of consistent perceptions 
of issue competence. 
Only 1196 respondents were interviewed in all three waves. The 
classification of these 1196 respondents according to the categorization 
discussed above is shown in table 7 .6. Notice that only seven (0.6 per-
cent) individuals fall into categories (1) and (2) so that it appears very 
few votes were cast because people had shifted their perceptions of 
which party was most competent to fight unemployment. Again these 
survey data support Roth's assertion that economic evaluations, expecta-
tions, and perceptions are to a great extent determined by party loyal-
ties. _ Seven lonesome .. "rational" voters stand against 600 steady party 
adherents. That we even fail to find in Roth's data the same percentage 
-oCcategory ( 1) and (2) voters that Jung found in his data is not so 
puzzling, however. Jung's panel covers a much longer period, and his 
definition of perceived issue competence is much broader, encompassing 
not only unemployment but all kinds of economic problems. 
6. Conclusions 
The present paper highlights several important aspects of the relationship 
between unemployment and election outcomes. Theoretically, it shows 
that the Downsian antigovernment hypothesis that "bad times hurt the 
ins" is not the only satisfactory interpretation of utility-maximizing 
voter rationality. The alternative clientele hypothesis is compatible with 
the rationality axiom as well, and it is less at variance with well-established 
findings of electoral research. For example, many studies have demori-
strated the importance of party identification in voting, though party 
identification need not to be limited to affective orientations but may also 
include stable beliefs on· which party generally will better serve one's 
interests. At the present time it seems impossible to choose between the 
Downsian and clientele hypotheses on a priori basis, and those who hold 
that this issue has theoretically settled long ago in favor of the Downsian 
hypothesis must face the possibility that it might rest on grossly oversim-
plified assumptions. 
The empirical findings reported in this paper do not in all respects 
corroborate previous work, though, in part, this might be because we are 
exclusively relying on a cross-sectional design. In this kind of aggregate 
data, unemployment has two distinct dimensions reflecting, on the one 
hand, the business cycle, and, on the other hand, problems of regional 
economic structure. Both dimensions here must be distinguished analyti-
cally, which is impossible, of course, in longitudinal analyses. The most 
surpr_Ls!llZ. fin_siing___~t_I!at f~_Q_s>~l]_Cof11ponents in the German 1976 
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election the clientele hypothesis is~u_IJ~r!()r to_t_he_antigovernment hYQQ=_ ___ _ 
thesiS.To determine the generalizability of this result, it would be use-
ful tö replicate this study for different elections and for different nations. 
Combining cross-sectional analyses of aggregate and individual level 
data for one particular election provided an opportunity for mutual 
validation of conclusions. These hopes were in vain. The effects of unem-
ployment on the 197 6 election outcome found in aggregate district data 
do not emerge at the individual level. In the survey data respondents' 
evaluations of unemployment were found to reflect, not to influence, 
their partisan affiliations. One major problem with this conclusion, how-
ever, is that we have had to rely on those respondents who have ex-
hibited a particular sequence of changes in perceived issue competence, 
party identification, and intention to vote to identify clearly "rational" 
issue voters on the unemployment issue. Setting aside the question 
whether we actually slzould have expected a higher percentage of such 
voters, we arc still Ieft with a formidable task for future research; namely, 
how can we dctermine whether there were other voters who also cast their 
votes according to their perceptions of a party's competence to deal with 
unemployment but for whom this did not imply that they had to change 
their party allegiance? 
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